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Four experiments (E1–E2–E3–E4) investigated whether different acquisition modalities lead to 
the emergence of differences typically found between concrete and abstract words, as argued by 
the words as tools (WAT) proposal.  To mimic the acquisition of concrete and abstract concepts, 
participants either manipulated novel objects or observed groups of objects interacting in novel 
ways (Training 1). In TEST 1 participants decided whether two elements belonged to the same 
category. Later they read the category labels (Training 2); labels could be accompanied by an 
explanation of their meaning.  Then participants observed previously seen exemplars and other 
elements, and were asked which of them could be named with a given label (TEST 2). Across 
the experiments, it was more difficult to form abstract than concrete categories (TEST 1); even 
when adding labels, abstract words remained more difficult than concrete words (TEST 2). 
TEST 3 differed across the experiments. In E1 participants performed a feature production task. 
Crucially, the associations produced with the novel words reflected the pattern evoked by existing 
concrete and abstract words, as the first evoked more perceptual properties. In E2–E3–E4,  TEST 
3 consisted of a color verification task with manual/verbal (keyboard–microphone) responses. 
Results showed the microphone use to have an advantage over keyboard use for abstract words, 
especially in the explanation condition. This supports WAT: due to their acquisition modality, 
concrete words evoke more manual information; abstract words elicit more verbal information. 
This advantage was not present when linguistic information contrasted with perceptual one. 
Implications for theories and computational models of language grounding are discussed.
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that this distinction captures some aspects of word meaning, and 
that it is important to understand how the process of abstraction 
occurs, from single instances to categories at different levels of 
abstraction. In particular, explaining the ways in which abstract 
words are represented constitutes a major challenge for embod-
ied and grounded views of cognition, as well as for embodied 
computational models and robotics. The problem abstract words 
pose for embodied and grounded theories is clearly synthesized 
by Barsalou (2008, p. 634) as follows: “Abstract concepts pose a 
classic challenge for grounded cognition. How can theories that 
focus on modal simulations explain concepts that do not appear 
modal?” We will first clarify why explaining abstract concepts is 
a crucial challenge for embodied cognition, and later clarify its 
importance for research in robotics.
According  to  the  standard  propositional  view  (e.g.,  Fodor, 
1998), the representation of both concrete and abstract concepts 
is abstract, symbolic, and amodal. In contrast, according to stand-
ard embodied accounts (e.g., Barsalou, 1999) both concrete and 
abstract concepts are grounded in perception and action systems, 
and therefore are modal. Notice that both standard propositional 
and embodied accounts evoke a single kind of representation, either 
amodal or modal, for both concrete and abstract concepts.
INTRODUCTION
How do children acquire abstract words? This paper presents a 
study on novel categories focusing on what differs in the acquisi-
tion of concrete and abstract words. One standard way of dif-
ferentiating between concrete and abstract words is to refer to 
their perceivability. Concrete words refer to entities that can be 
perceived through the senses. Abstract words refer to entities more 
detached from physical experience (Paivio et al., 1986; Crystal, 
1995; Barsalou et al., 2003). However, the distinction between con-
crete and abstract words cannot be conceived of as a dichotomy 
(Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001). For example, words referring to 
social roles (e.g., “physician”) might be more abstract than words 
referring to single objects (e.g., “bottle”), but less abstract than 
purely definitional words (e.g., “odd number”) (Keil, 1989). In 
addition, words referring to emotions probably require special 
classification (Altarriba et al., 1999). Further, basic and subordinate 
words, such as “cat” and “Siamese cat,” referring to single entities, 
can be seen as more concrete than superordinate words, such as 
“animal,” that refer to sets of entities that differ in shape and other 
perceptual characteristics (e.g., Borghi et al., 2005). To summarize, 
the distinction between concrete and abstract words is not clear-
cut, and should be intended as a continuum. However, we believe Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognition    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 15  |  2
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rely on verbal explanations (for example, explaining the meaning of 
“democracy” requires many more other words than for explaining 
the meaning of “bread”). In this respect, the role played by words as 
social tools is more important for abstract than for concrete words. 
Evidence relevant to this issue was obtained by Wauters et al. (2003), 
who studied different modalities of acquisition (MOA) of words. 
They did not however, speak directly about concrete vs. abstract 
words. According to the authors, the meaning of a word like “ball” is 
acquired through perception, because every time the child hears the 
word, he/she sees a real ball, or a picture of it. The meaning of a word 
like “grammar,” instead, has to be explained linguistically. Finally, 
the meaning of a word like “tundra” can be acquired in both ways, 
depending on the environment where it is learned. WAT predicts 
that this difference in the acquisition process can explain why, for 
concrete and abstract words both perception–action and linguistic 
information are activated. Linguistic and social information how-
ever, plays a more important role for abstract than for concrete words 
(e.g., Crutch and Warrington, 2005; Sabsevitz et al., 2005).
From  a  different  perspective,  an  embodied  and  grounded 
account of the difference between concrete and abstract words is 
crucial in the process of developing intelligent machines capable of 
autonomously creating categories and using language. In compu-
tational cognitive science, robotics offers new opportunities for the 
design of artificial agents in which language is grounded on their 
ability to manipulate and experience the external world by means 
of physical interactions. The symbol grounding problem (Harnad, 
1990) highlights the fact that, in traditional computational models, 
symbols are self-referential entities that require the interpretation 
of an external experimenter to identify the referential meaning of 
the lexical items. This issue has been widely discussed in the realm 
of cognitive science, and robotics offers a completely different way 
to solve the grounding problem. Indeed, in the last 20 years, many 
different models were created with the explicit aim of grounding 
symbols and language in perception (e.g., Steels, 2003) and, more 
recently, in action (Sugita and Tani, 2005; Marocco et al., 2010). 
Although the embodied approach to language in robotics is gaining 
increased interest, both in terms of cognitive modeling and applica-
tions, the current trend is strongly focused on systems capable of 
autonomously acquiring concrete concepts and words, that can be 
grounded on perception and action processes of the robot. Existing 
models do not focus on the acquisition of abstract words, except 
for highlighting that such abstract concepts and words perme-
ate the entire domain of human language experience and cannot 
be neglected. Nevertheless, an extension of the actual grounding 
approach in robotics to abstract words is not automatic. In this 
regard, we believe that the WAT proposal offers an interesting way 
to incorporate abstract words in future cognitive robotic models 
without compromising the grounding and the embodied approach, 
which should be the milestone of the future robotics. On the other 
hand, a robotic model could be useful to complement traditional 
psychological experiments, and provide further evidence on the 
feasibility of a novel theory, such as the WAT proposal presented.
In this research we used novel categories to mimic the different 
ways in which concrete and abstract word meanings are acquired 
and then represented. Reported experiments are designed in a way 
that allows for replication with a computational model. Similar 
stimuli and training processes can be used to create a cognitive 
In contrast, recent views propose that multiple representational 
systems are activated during conceptual processing (e.g., Louwerse 
and Jeuniaux, 2010; for a non-embodied version of this view, see 
Dove, 2009). According to these views both sensorimotor and lin-
guistic information play a role in conceptual representation. This 
idea is not entirely novel. The seminal dual coding theory by Paivio 
et al. (1986) applies two different kinds of representations, a linguis-
tic and a sensorimotor code, to explain how concrete and abstract 
words are represented and recalled. Concrete words are recalled 
more easily because they activate both sensorimotor and linguistic 
information; differently abstract words are not “grounded,” they 
only evoke linguistic information. Recent support to Paivio’s the-
ory comes from studies on brain imaging showing that abstract 
word processing is strongly lateralized toward the left hemisphere, 
while activation during processing concrete words is bilateral (for a 
review, see Sabsevitz et al., 2005). However, this might be due to the 
fact that the majority of the studies employ single words and tasks 
requiring a superficial level of processing. Recent studies requir-
ing deeper processing, such as sentence sensibility evaluation tasks, 
do not provide evidence in favor of a pronounced laterality (e.g., 
Desai et al., 2010). The major difference between Paivio’s view and 
the embodied accounts we will refer to is based on the concept of 
multiple representation; to elaborate, Paivio argues that abstract 
words are not “grounded” in perception and action systems, whereas 
according to the embodied perspective both concrete and abstract 
words activate both linguistic and perception–action information, 
even if these two kinds of information are differently distributed.
The language and situated simulation (LASS) theory is prob-
ably the most well-known of the multiple representation theories 
(Barsalou et al., 2008). In this view both the linguistic and the 
sensorimotor system are activated during word processing. The 
understanding  of  word  meanings  always  implies  activation  of 
the sensorimotor system (simulation), but for tasks which do not 
require deep processing the linguistic system might suffice. While 
presenting the LASS theory, Barsalou et al. (2008) suggest that for 
abstract concepts, linguistic information might be more relevant 
than for concrete concepts, but they do not advance clear predic-
tions pertaining the differences in processing between concrete and 
abstract concepts, independently from the task. Thus, they argue 
that “different mixtures of the language and simulation systems 
support the processing of abstract concepts under different task 
conditions.” (Barsalou et al., 2008, p. 267).
More precise predictions concerning the difference between con-
crete and abstract words are advanced by the words as tools (WAT) 
proposal (Borghi and Cimatti, 2009, 2010), which assumes the exist-
ence of multiple representations. WAT is based on the idea, initially 
proposed by Wittgenstein (1953), that words are tools we use (see 
also Clark, 1998). Similarly to real tools, words can be considered 
as instruments to act in the social world, thus as social tools. The 
difference between concrete and abstract words is explained by WAT 
referring to the fact that, due to a different acquisition process, the 
role played by actions performed through words – by linguistic 
information – is more relevant for abstract than for concrete words. 
The present work aims to directly test the WAT proposal using novel 
categories and novel linguistic labels. According to WAT percep-
tion and action are crucial in the acquisition of concrete words. 
Instead to acquire the meaning of an abstract word children also www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 15  |  3
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c – Real words evidence match: TEST 3 of Experiment 1 con-
sisted of a feature production task. We predicted that the pattern of 
produced properties would match that typically obtained in feature 
generation tasks with concrete and abstract words.
d – Linguistic vs. Manual Information: in Experiments 2, 3, 
and 4, TEST 3 consisted of a property verification task. We chose 
to ask participants to respond to the objects’ color because color 
was not relevant to the motor response. In one condition partici-
pants were required to provide a manual response (i.e., to press 
a key on the keyboard), and in another a verbal response (i.e., 
to respond “yes” with the microphone; see Scorolli and Borghi, 
2007). We predicted facilitation for manual responses with con-
crete words and for mouth responses with abstract words. This 
would demonstrate that language is part of the representation of 
abstract words meanings. The rationale is the following: if lin-
guistic information is more relevant for the representation of the 
meaning of abstract compared to concrete words, with abstract 
words phono-articulatory aspects should be accessed more easily 
compared to sensorimotor manual ones. Therefore, a linguis-
tic response (even a simple “yes” response) should be facilitated 
compared to a manual one.
EXPERIMENT 1
The  experiment  was  designed  to  mimic  the  acquisition  of 
concrete  and  abstract  categories  and  to  verify  whether  the 
novel  categories  we  used  reproduced  the  acquisition  proc-
ess that occurs with real world categories. As anticipated, in 
Experiment 1, TEST 3 consisted of a production task. Before 
starting the experiment, participants were randomly assigned 
to two groups. One group was first shown the category and 
then tested on concrete items; later participants were shown 
and then tested on abstract items; the other group first learned 
and then was tested on the two kinds of items in reverse order. 
Across the experiments the order of presentation of the two 
blocks (concrete block; abstract block) was counterbalanced. 
The same methodological choice was applied to all the other 
three experiments.
METHOD
Participants
Sixteen students of the University of Bologna took part in the study 
(three men; mean age = 20.31 years; SD = 1.62). All were native 
Italian speakers, both right- and left-handed (two left-handed) 
and all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The study was 
approved by the local ethics committee.
Materials
3D figures of novel objects and related new labels. We invented four 
novel words (calona, fusapo, norolo, tocesa) all having the same 
number of syllables and letters. We avoided using new words with 
ambiguous accents. Two of the four words ended with the vocal “a,” 
which in Italian characterizes the female gender; the remaining two 
words ended with the vocal “o,” which in Italian characterizes the 
male gender. The new words corresponded to four new categories 
of objects, composed of 12 exemplars each (4 × 12). The crite-
ria we followed to construct the “original” three new objects were 
the following:
based   controller for a humanoid robot (Tikhanoff et al., 2008) that 
will be able to perform an identical categorization task. We defined 
concrete   concepts as having a concrete, manipulable object as a ref-
erent. Abstract concepts, on the other hand, do not have a single, 
manipulable object as referent; instead they refer to rather complex 
relations between entities. We acknowledge that the distinction we 
made for operational simplicity is not exhaustive and that it covers 
only a subset of items. For example, it leaves out word meanings 
referring to perceivable but not manipulable objects or entities, such 
as “cloud,” “mountain,” and “moon.” Even if the referents of these 
words cannot be manipulated, we would consider them as concrete, 
as their referents are clearly perceivable, can be scanned (acted upon) 
with the eyes, and are easy to imagine. We decided to address the 
distinction between concrete and abstract words starting from the 
extremes of the continuum: for this reason we decided to focus on 
concrete, manipulable objects. As for abstract word meanings, here 
we did not refer to purely definitional abstract word meanings, simply 
based on verbal explanations (as it might be the case for a word like 
“philosophy”) but to word meanings that evoke complex relation-
ships between entities; due to their complexity, we suspect applying 
a linguistic label and explaining their meaning is crucial in order to 
form categories. Consider that the referents of our abstract catego-
ries were interacting moving objects – thus they were perceivable, 
similarly to the referents of concrete categories. As a matter of fact, in 
our view the formation of abstract categories always starts with some 
form of perception, be it visual, acoustic, tactile, or otherwise.
Due to the difficulties involved in reproducing the acquisition of 
different kinds – concrete vs. abstract – of novel concepts/words in 
an artificial setting (i.e., laboratory), we operationalized the acquisi-
tion process considering two phases – the experience and the word 
acquisition – as follows:
a – Novel concepts acquisition: Training 1 (Experience) was 
designed to mimic the acquisition of concrete and abstract con-
cepts. The idea underlying these two different acquisition processes 
is that, where typically concrete concepts refer to category members 
which are perceptually similar or elicit similar actions, abstract 
concepts refer to entities that show complex interactions, or do not 
share an evident perceptual similarity (i.e., common features are not 
perceptually salient). We showed participants 3D figures of novel 
objects vs. 3D figures of objects interacting in novel ways. Then 
participants were tested (TEST 1: Categorical Recognition).
b  –  Novel  labels  acquisition:  during  Training  2  (Words 
Acquisition) participants were taught the category name; in some 
conditions a verbal explanation of the category meaning was added. 
Then participants were tested (TEST 2: Words–Objects Match). 
We predicted that in both tests participants would produce less 
errors with concrete than with abstract categories, as the first can be 
formed more easily on perceptual and motor basis. This difference 
should be reduced when a category label and a linguistic explana-
tion of what the category members had in common were given.
The  manipulation  of  TEST  3  in  the  different  experiments 
allowed us to check for the effectiveness of our operationalization 
of acquisition process (Experiment 1), as well as to test if the verbal 
labeling, possibly strengthened by a verbal explanation, reinforces 
learning of both concrete and abstract categories in different ways 
(Experiments 2, 3, and 4).Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognition    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 15  |  4
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static figure to the two interacting ones. This aimed to repro-
duce real-life abstract word acquisition: some abstract words can 
evoke both relations between entities and static visual images 
(e.g., “freedom” can evoke a bird flying in the sky as well as an 
image of the Statue of Liberty). In other words, it can happen 
that objects which would be first categorized as exemplars of a 
concrete category (e.g., a statue) can be re-categorized and evoked 
by abstract words.
 The other nine exemplars for each category were built by using 
parallelepipeds (3 × 2) instead of cylinders; the movement of the 3D 
figures followed a vertical instead of a horizontal direction (6 × 2). 
Finally, we built 40 3D figures to use as fillers, and we constructed 
40 relations between 3D figures to use as fillers. They did not belong 
to a category and were not assigned a name. The duration of each 
relation was the same for both the categories’ exemplars and the 
fillers (4 s).
Procedure
Across all experiments, participants were trained and tested indi-
vidually in a quiet laboratory room. They sat on a comfortable 
chair in front of a computer screen. All participants were submit-
ted to two training phases (Experience; Word Acquisition) and to 
three different tests (Categorical Recognition; Word–Object Match; 
Production).
Training 1: experience. Training 1 aimed to reproduce the different 
processes underlying the acquisition of concrete and abstract con-
cepts. Whereas typically concrete words refer to category members 
which are perceptually similar or elicit similar actions, abstract 
words refer to entities that show complex interactions or do not 
share an evident perceptual similarity (i.e., common features are not 
perceptually salient). For example, the word “truth” binds experi-
ences and situations that might be rather complex and different. 
During this training session participants were sitting in front of 
the computer screen. They were exposed to 20 trials. In each trial 
either three 3D figures (in the concrete concept acquisition condi-
tion) or three relations between 3D figures (in the abstract concept 
acquisition condition), were shown. Both the 3D figures and the 
relations were novel, i.e., participants had never experienced them 
before. In order to mimic the acquisition of concrete concepts (e.g., 
1.  CALONA was a 3D concave figure (“C” shaped). The colors we 
used were sky-blue and light-gray;
2.  FUSAPO was a 3D figures with five protuberances (“*”sha-
ped). The colors we used were blue and yellow (Figure 1);
3.  NOROLO was a 3D figure with small convex nooks (“N” sha-
ped). The colors we used were red and gray;
4.  TOCESA was a 3D figure shaped as wavy slash, without inter-
nal convexities or concavities (“I” shaped). The colors we used 
were violet and beige.
The other nine exemplars for each category were both built by 
inverting the surface and depth colors (3 × 2), and by rotating the 
original figures by 180° (6 × 2). Finally, we built 40 3D figures that 
were used as fillers: they did not belong to a category and were not 
assigned a name.
3D figures of novel relations and related new labels. We invented 
four new words (cofiro, latofo, panifa, rodela) by following the 
same criteria as described for the linguistic labels used for the 3D 
figures of novel objects. These new words referred to new categories 
of relations between two 3D figures; each of these categories was 
composed by 12 exemplars (4 × 12). We used the following criteria 
to construct the “original” three new relations (that is, novel groups 
of 3D interacting objects):
a.  COFIRO: two 3D moving figures. After the contact just one 3D 
figure remained, and it moved in a straight line or in a curved 
line;
b.  LATOFO: one 3D static figure and two 3D moving figures. After 
the contact two 3D figures appeared at the opposite diagonal 
sides of the computer screen (e.g., one at the top right of the 
screen and the other at the bottom left of the screen), and they 
moved converging toward the central point of the screen;
c.  PANIFA: two 3D moving figures. After the contact one of them 
moved in a straight line; the other one executed a turning 
movement with a different velocity (Figure 2);
d.  RODELA: one 3D static figure and two 3D moving figures. 
After the contact the two 3D figures moved in a same (straight) 
line and with the same velocity, but in an opposite direction, as 
if the figures were pushed away from each other.
 All the 3D figures were sky-blue cylinders; they were arranged 
horizontally, one came from one part of the screen and the other 
from the other side. For LATOFO and RODELA we added a 3D 
Figure 1 | An exemplar of the concrete category FuSAPO; all other 
category members were perceptually similar to the shown exemplar.
Figure 2 | An exemplar of the abstract category PANiFA; the figure 
shows three phases – initial (A), intermediate (B) and final (C) – of the 
interacting movement. All the other category members were not perceptually 
similar, but showed similar complex interactions.www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 15  |  5
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were displayed on the computer screen: the target object, corre-
sponding to the label, and another nearby, which in half of the 
trials was novel and in the remaining 12 trials was an exemplar 
already associated with a different label. One of the two figures/
relations was located on the left of the screen, the other on the 
right; the figure location was counterbalanced. Participants were 
required to decide by pressing a different key (left, right) on the 
keyboard which of the two was named with the shown label. This 
second test aimed to verify whether participants had associated a 
label with a category, and whether they were able to generalize it to 
a different category. We predicted that participants would produce 
fewer errors with concrete than with abstract categories, as the first 
rely more than the second on perception and action. However, 
the difference between concrete and abstract categories should be 
reduced compared to TEST 1, given that participants could now 
rely on linguistic labels as well.
TEST 3: production task. After TEST 2, TEST 3 consisted of a fea-
ture production task with novel category names. The experimenter 
told participants each category name (in four random orders) ask-
ing them to produce the first properties that came to their mind. 
They were prompted to produce properties until they stopped for 
about 15 s. Properties produced were transcribed; both their fre-
quency and production order was recorded. We predicted that the 
pattern of produced properties would match that typically obtained 
in production tasks with concrete and abstract words. Behavioral 
studies with production tasks, such as word association and prop-
erty generation tasks, have shown that, whereas concrete words 
activate mainly perceptual and thematic relations, abstract words 
typically elicit more taxonomic relations (Borghi and Caramelli, 
2001); in addition, they elicit more situations and introspective 
relations compared with concrete words (Barsalou and Wiemer-
Hastings, 2005).
RESULTS
Across all experiments, significant results will be reported.
TEST 1: Categorical Recognition
We performed a one-way ANOVA on errors produced in the cat-
egorical recognition task, in which the factor Concept (Concrete 
vs. Abstract) was manipulated within participants. As predicted, 
Abstract Concepts (M = 5.21%) elicited more errors than Concrete 
Ones (M = 2.34%), F(1,15) = 12.70, MSE = 5.17, p < 0.005 (see 
Table 1).
TEST 2: Words–Objects Match
An ANOVA was performed on the errors produced. Consider that 
two objects were presented on the screen, the target one and another 
object. Therefore in the ANOVA two factors were entered, both 
manipulated within participants: the factor Word (Concrete vs. 
Abstract) and the factor Other Exemplar (Novel vs. Learned). Both 
factors reached significance; Abstract Words (M = 5.01% ) elicited 
more errors than Concrete Ones (M = 1.37%), F(1,15) = 11.96, 
MSE = 17.79, p < 0.005, and more errors were produced when 
the target exemplar was presented with a Learned (M = 4.17%) 
than with a Novel Other Exemplar (M = 2.21%), F(1,15) = 15.70, 
MSE = 3.89, p < 0.005 (see Table 1).
BOTTLE), participants were presented with 3D figures of novel 
objects as previously described. They were instructed to verify 
whether the objects could be inserted inside a donut shaped 3D 
figure. The experimenter invited them to manipulate the objects 
with the mouse for 12 s each. In order to simulate the acquisition 
of abstract concepts (e.g., TRUTH), participants were instructed 
to observe the groups of dynamic objects until the end of their 
interaction (12 s). The 3D figures interacted in ways that revealed 
the existence of a common structure. For example, two objects 
moved toward each other, then only one of them remained on the 
screen, moving in a straight line (COFIRO).
TEST 1: Categorical Recognition. Training 1 was followed by a 
categorical recognition task (TEST 1). Participants were instructed 
to look at a fixation cross that remained on the screen for 500 ms. 
Then they were shown two exemplars of the same or different 
categories, and were asked to judge whether the stimuli belonged 
to the same category or not by pressing two different keys (left, 
right). The key–response mapping was counterbalanced. They were 
shown 24 randomly ordered trials, with different combinations of 
the exemplars or of the exemplars and fillers, that is:
1.  two exemplars of the same category;
2.  two exemplars belonging to two different categories;
3.  one exemplar of a category and one filler, that did not belong 
to any learned category.
Concrete concepts’ exemplars remained on the screen for 2 s, 
while abstract concepts’ exemplars were displayed for 10 s. The 24 
experimental trials were preceded by two training trials.
The Categorical Recognition task aimed to verify whether the 
training phase allowed participants to form a category on a purely 
sensorimotor basis, and to contrast it with a different category. 
We collected and analyzed errors, as this is the more reliable and 
informative measure for this particular task. Across all studies, 
percentages of errors are reported. We predicted that participants 
would produce less errors with concrete than with abstract cat-
egories, as the first can be formed more easily without the aid 
of language.
Training 2: Words Acquisition. After TEST 1, participants were 
trained to associate a linguistic label to each learned exemplar. Five 
exemplars from each category were randomly selected and they 
were presented once to participants together with the appropriate 
linguistic label. In order to mimic the acquisition of concrete words 
participants were shown 20 3D figures together with the related 
linguistic labels (“calona,” “fusapo,” “norolo,” “tocesa”), presented 
in random order. Each trial lasted 2 s. Symmetrically, in order to 
simulate the acquisition of abstract words, participants observed 
the 20 relations together with the related linguistic labels (“cofiro,” 
“latofo,” “panifa,” “rodela”), presented in random order. Each trial 
lasted 4 s. Participants were instructed to learn the linguistic labels 
associated with the 3D figures and with the relations.
TEST 2: Words–Objects Match. After the Training 2 participants 
had to perform a Words–Objects Match task. They were presented 
with 24 trials. One of the learned names and two figures/relations Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognition    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 15  |  6
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properties typical of real-life abstract words (e.g., “singularity”; 
“variation”; “linear motion”); this was symmetrically true for the 
novel Concrete Words which elicited a higher number of proper-
ties such as “hole in the middle,” “stick-shaped,” “crab-shaped.” 
In addition, the average rating on each property was multiplied 
by the position of the property produced for each participant 
according to the formula (n + 1 − p)/(n − 1) × r, where n is the 
total number of properties produced by each participant for each 
word, p the position in which each property was produced, and 
r the average rating on that particular property (for a similar 
procedure, see Wu and Barsalou, 2009). This normalized p is 
the position in which each property was produced, in relation 
to n, the total number of properties produced by each partici-
pant. One ANOVA was performed on the obtained mean values, 
with participants as random factor; the factor manipulated was 
the kind of Word (Abstract vs. Concrete Words). The ANOVA 
again revealed lower mean values for Concrete (M = 3.11) than 
for Abstract Words (M = 4.48), F(1,15) = 55.38, MSE = 0.27, 
p < 0.00001. This indicates that with our novel Concrete Words 
properties typically elicited by real concrete words were elic-
ited earlier, and the same was symmetrically true for our novel 
Abstract Words (see Table 1).
DISCUSSION
Results of Experiment 1 indicate that with our training with novel 
categories and words we were able to recreate the real-life situation 
in which concrete and abstract words are learned.
Results for TEST 1 (categorical recognition) indicated that 
it is more difficult to form abstract categories than concrete 
ones.  In  addition,  results  of  TEST  3  (property  generation 
task) showed that the properties produced for the concrete 
and abstract words we created corresponded to those typically 
obtained with existing concrete and abstract words. Results of 
TEST 1 and TEST 3 revealed that abstract categories are more 
difficult to form, and that abstract words are represented differ-
ently from concrete ones, as they elicit less perceptual proper-
ties, such as properties related to shape, and more abstract and 
relational properties.
The higher difficulty of abstract words compared to concrete 
ones was also maintained in TEST 2 (Words–Objects Match), 
when participants learned to associate a novel word to a category. 
Results on TEST 2 showed that the use of linguistic labels did 
not further facilitate the acquisition of abstract in comparison 
to concrete words. This reveals that the higher complexity of 
abstract concepts is not reduced thanks to the use of linguistic 
labels. A possibility is that, in order to reduce the complexity of 
abstract words, a verbal explanation of the category meaning 
is needed.
EXPERIMENT 2
Given  our  results  on  Words–Objects  Match  (TEST  2)  in 
Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 we decided to add a verbal expla-
nation to the linguistic label used for abstract categories. This 
should mirror the way the acquisition process works. Abstract 
words differ from concrete words insofar that the first refer to 
a variety of situations, states, events. Due to this complexity, 
linguistic labels should be more relevant for abstract than for 
TEST 3: production task
Different  analyses  were  performed  on  the  production  task. 
The number of produced properties did not differ significantly 
between Concrete (M = 4.18) and Abstract Words (M = 3.73); 
p = 0.29. The properties produced with each word were put 
together, organized in two different random orders, and 12 par-
ticipants were asked to rate the produced properties on a 7-point 
scale. They were required to select 1 if they believed that the 
property was typical of words having “concrete” referents, such 
as bottles, screwdriver, building, cellular, and cat, and 7 if they 
thought the property was typical of words having “abstract” ref-
erents, such as happiness, philosophy, risk, fantasy, democracy. 
The raters did not know which situation the properties had been 
produced in. We performed an ANOVA on the ratings of the 
properties produced with concrete and abstract words. As pre-
dicted, we found that abstract words elicited significantly higher 
scores than concrete words (M = 3.93; M = 3.13), F(1,11) = 27.51, 
MSE = 0.14, p < 0.001. In addition, the scaled ratings were applied 
to the individual protocols in order to verify whether the proper-
ties produced and the production order of the properties for each 
word reflected the properties typically produced for concrete 
or for abstract words (the same method was used by Borghi 
and Barsalou, 2001; Borghi, 2004; Wu and Barsalou, 2009). The 
average rating of each property was multiplied by the frequency 
of the produced property for each of the participants. A one-
way ANOVA was performed on the obtained mean values, with 
participants as the random factor. The only factor manipulated 
was significant, F(1,11) = 27.51, MSE = 0.14, p < 0.001, as the 
mean values obtained with Abstract Words (M = 4.14) were 
higher than those produced with Concrete Words (M = 3.04), 
indicating that the novel Abstract Words we created elicited 
Table 1 | errors percentages and standard deviations (in parenthesis) for 
TeST 1 and TeST 2 of experiment 1. For TEST 3 we reported results on 
ratings’ scores.
  eXPeriMeNT 1
CATegOriCAl reCOgNiTiON
Concept  Concrete  Abstract
  2.34 (2.62)  5.21 (2.95)
WOrdS–OBjeCTS MATCh
Word  Concrete  Abstract
  1.37 (1.64)  5.01 (4.90)
Other Exemplar  Novel Exemplar  Learnt 
    Exemplar
  2.21 (3.66)  4.17 (4.27)
PrOduCTiON
Scaled ratings (1 concrete referent → 7 abstract referent) applied to the
individual protocols
Word  Concrete  Abstract
  3.04 (0.29)  4.14 (0.29)
Normalized position in which each property was produced (n + 1 − p)/
(n − 1) × r
Word  Concrete  Abstract
  3.11 (0.25)  4.48 (0.46)www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 15  |  7
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RESULTS
TEST 1: Categorical Recognition
In the one-way ANOVA conducted on error rates the factor Concept 
(Concrete vs. Abstract), which was manipulated within partici-
pants, was highly significant. As predicted and as in Experiment 1, 
Abstract Concepts (M = 6.18%) elicited more errors than Concrete 
Ones (M = 1.82%), F(1,31) = 51.32, MSE = 5.92, p < 0.0000001 
(see Table 2).
TEST 2: Words–Objects Match
We performed two different ANOVAs on the errors produced, one 
for the No Explanation group (A) and another for the Explanation 
group (B). In the first ANOVA two factors were manipulated within 
participants, Word (Abstract vs. Concrete, both without expla-
nation) and Other Exemplar (Novel vs. Learned). In the second 
ANOVA the same factors were manipulated but, as far as the Word 
factor is concerned, we contrasted Abstract Words with Explanation 
vs.  Concrete Words  without  Explanation.  In  the  first ANOVA, 
Abstract Words (M = 4.04%) elicited more errors than Concrete 
Ones (M = 1.17%), F(1, 15) = 12.01, MSE = 10.93, p < 0.005, and 
more errors were produced when the target exemplar was associated 
with a Learned (M = 3.52%) than with a Novel Other Exemplar 
(M = 1.69%), F(1,15) = 13.35, MSE = 3.98, p < 0.005 (see Table 2). 
In addition, the interaction between Word and Other Exemplar 
was significant, F(1,15) = 5.46, MSE = 3.19, p < 0.04. Post hoc LSD 
showed that all differences were significant (p < 0.05), with the 
exception of the difference between Concrete Words accompa-
nied with a Learned vs. Novel Exemplar. With Abstract Words, 
instead,  a  Target  Exemplar  presented  together  with  a  Learned 
Exemplar elicited more errors than a Target Exemplar associated 
with a Novel Exemplar (p < 0.0005). In the second ANOVA both 
main effects were significant: Abstract Words with Explanation 
(M = 3.19%) elicited more errors than Concrete Words without 
explanation (M = 0.98%), F(1, 15) = 6.09, MSE = 12.87, p < 0.05, 
and more errors were produced when the target exemplar was 
associated with a Learned (M = 2.67%) than with a Novel Other 
Exemplar (M = 1.50%), F(1,15) = 6.09, MSE = 12.87, p < 0.05 
(see Table 2).
TEST 3: property verification task with keyboard vs. microphone
In TEST 3 we collected both RTs and errors, for a number of reasons. 
First, previous work on the influence of action sentences on key-
board and microphone response devices was performed recording 
response times (e.g., Scorolli and Borghi, 2007). Second, differently 
from TEST 1 and TEST 2, no figures were presented, and partici-
pants had to read and respond to verbal questions. Thus there were 
no differences in the presentation timing of concrete categories 
(static figures) and abstract ones (videos). We will report results 
based on LSD test (p < 0.05) and discuss the results crucial for our 
hypotheses. Even though we collected RTs as well, we believe that, 
given that we study word acquisition, accuracy probably represents 
the most important measure of participants’ performance.
About 24.77% of the trials were removed as errors. RTs above 
or below two standard deviations from each participant’s mean 
values for correct trials were excluded from this analysis. This 
trimming method leads to the removal of further 3.39% of the 
data. The mean RTs for correct responses for true trials for each 
concrete words acquisition, and the first might also require a 
verbal explanation of their meaning. This is often not the case 
for concrete words, for which the linguistic label is usually asso-
ciated with the presence of the object. Experiment 2 aimed to 
test whether there is a facilitation effect when the meaning of 
abstract words is explained linguistically, compared to when only 
the linguistic label is provided.
In addition, the aim of Experiment 2 is to verify whether the dif-
ferent acquisition modality has an impact on the response modality. 
We designed a property verification task (TEST 3), to be performed 
in substitution of the production task of Experiment 1 in order to 
address this aim. We chose to use color as the target property as 
color was not relevant to the motor response and to the response 
device that we used.
Specifically, we predicted that, given that for concrete words 
manual information is more relevant than for abstract ones, par-
ticipants should be faster to perform a property verification task 
with concrete words when they had to respond using a keyboard 
instead of a microphone. Symmetrically, if it is true that linguistic 
information is more important for the acquisition of abstract word 
meanings than for concrete ones, faster responses should be noted 
with regard to abstract words while responding with the micro-
phone than with the keyboard. We expect a stronger effect when 
abstract words are presented not only with novel verbal labels but 
with the explanations as well.
METHOD
Participants
Thirty-two students of the University of Bologna took part in the 
study (eight men; mean age = 20.44 years; SD = 1.41). All were 
native Italian speakers and right-handed.
Procedure
All  participants  were  submitted  to  two  training  phases 
(Experience;  Word  Acquisition)  and  to  three  different  tests 
(Categorical Recognition; Word–Object Match; Property verifi-
cation task). Training 1 and TEST 1 were identical to Experiment 
1. However, Training 2 varied, as participants were randomly 
assigned to two different conditions, the Explanation or No 
Explanation  condition.  In  the  Explanation  condition  with 
abstract words half of the participants were told the name of 
the abstract category and were given an explanation clarify-
ing the similarities of the members of a given category; in the 
No  Explanation  condition  only  the  name  was  associated  to 
the category. Training 2 for concrete categories was the same 
of Experiment 1.
In TEST 3 participants took part in a color verification task. 
Questions appeared on the screen, for example, “Is LATOFO yel-
low?” To respond “yes” or “no” they had to press two keys on the 
keyboard in one block (24 trials), or to pronounce the word “yes” 
or “no” in the microphone in another block (24 trials). The block 
order was counterbalanced. Both response times and errors were 
recorded. Forty-eight responses were recorded; “yes” responses 
corresponded  to  questions  on  five  different  colors  (blue,  red, 
violet, yellow for concrete words and sky-blue for abstract), and 
“no” responses corresponded to questions about five wrong colors 
(black, brown, green, orange, white).Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognition    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 15  |  8
Borghi et al.  Concrete and abstract words acquisition
Two further ANOVAs on errors were performed, in which the 
same factors were manipulated. In both analyses the factor Word 
reached significance: Concrete Words (group A: M = 15.69%; group 
B: M = 15.04%) elicited more errors than Abstract Words (group 
A: M = 10.55%, F(1,15) = 4.49, MSE = 94.38, p < 0.05; group B: 
M = 7.75%, F(1,15) = 26.04, MSE = 32.69, p < 0.0005), probably due 
to the different difficulty level involved in processing the color prop-
erty. Crucially, the introduction of the explanation strongly reduced 
errors with Abstract Words (10.55 vs. 7.75%; see Table 2).
DISCUSSION
Results of Experiment 2 confirmed and extended those obtained in 
Experiment 1. Results on the recognition test confirm the results of 
Experiment 1, indicating that it is more difficult to form abstract 
categories than concrete ones. As in Experiment 1, TEST 2 showed 
that when participants learned to associate a novel word with a 
category, abstract words caused more difficulty in comparison to 
concrete words. Interestingly, abstract words without Explanation 
(group A) produced a significantly higher frequency of errors 
when the exemplar nearby has already been learned: this suggests 
that the categorical boundaries are less marked with exemplars 
participant  were  submitted  to  two  ANOVAs,  one  for  the  No 
Explanation group (A) and another for the Explanation group 
(B). In the first ANOVA two factors were manipulated within par-
ticipants: Word (Abstract vs. Concrete, both without explanation) 
and Response Device (Keyboard vs. Microphone). In the second 
ANOVA we manipulated the same factors but, with the factor 
Word, we contrasted Abstract Words with Explanation vs. Concrete 
Words without Explanation. In both ANOVAs the factor Word 
was significant. Abstract Words (M = 958 and 950 ms, respec-
tively) were responded to significantly faster than Concrete ones 
(M = 1192 ms; M = 1200 ms), F(1,15) = 12.52, MSE = 69871.63, 
p < 0.005; F(1,15) = 57.04, MSE = 17525.17, p < 0.0001 (see 
Table 2). Crucially in the second ANOVA we found an interaction 
between the kind of Words and the kind of Device, F(1,15) = 11.18, 
MSE = 91173.10, p < 0.005: Concrete Words were responded to 
significantly faster with the keyboard (M = 1057 ms) than with the 
microphone (M = 1343 ms; LSD post hoc, p < 0.05); symmetrically 
Abstract Words were responded to faster with the microphone 
(M = 841 ms) than with the keyboard (M = 1059 ms; LSD post 
hoc, p < 0.06; see Figure 3).
The main effect of Word on both the analyses is of marginal 
interest, as it is probably due to the fact that the task was easier to 
perform when using Abstract Words, as the figures/entities referred 
to through abstract words were always light blue colored, whereas 
objects referred to by concrete words differed in colors. Much more 
crucial for our hypotheses is the interaction between Word and 
Response Device found in the second ANOVA (group B): as pre-
dicted, with Abstract Words provided by a verbal Explanation RTs 
were faster with the microphone than with the keyboard; symmetri-
cally with Concrete Words RTs were slower with the microphone 
than with the keyboard (see Figure 3). Finally it is interesting to 
notice the difference between Abstract and Concrete Words, still 
present without the Explanation (group A, 234 ms), was increased 
by the introduction of the verbal Explanation (group B, 250 ms), 
particularly in case of mouth responses.
Table 2 | errors percentages and standard deviations (in parenthesis) for each TeST of experiment 2.
eXPeriMeNT 2
CATegOriCAl reCOgNiTiON
Concept    Concrete  Abstract
    1.82 (2.17)  6.18 (3.45)
WOrdS–OBjeCTS MATCh
Group A  Word  Concrete without explanation  Abstract without explanation
    1.17 (1.75)  4.04 (3.99)
  Other Exemplar  Novel Exemplar  Learned Exemplar
    1.69 (2.62)  3.52 (3.83)
Group B  Word  Concrete with explanation  Abstract with explanation
    0.98 (1.75)  3.19 (3.55)
  Other Exemplar  Novel Exemplar  Learned Exemplar
    1.05 (2.44)  2.67 (3.40)
PrOPerTy veriFiCATiON TASK: KeyBOArd vS. MiCrOPhONe
Group A  Word  Concrete without explanation  Abstract without explanation
    15.69 (8.47)  10.55 (8.52)
Group B  Word  Concrete without explanation  Abstract with explanation
    15.04 (5.77)  7 .75 (5.63)
Figure 3 | experiment 2, group B: interaction between Words (Abstract 
with explanation, Concrete) and response device (Keyboard, 
Microphone).www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 15  |  9
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METHOD
Participants
Eighteen  students  of  the  University  of  Bologna  took  part  in 
the study (nine men; mean age = 23.00 years; SD = 2.30). All 
were native Italian speakers, both right- and left-handed (one 
left handed).
Procedure
All participants were submitted to two training phases (Experience; 
Word  Acquisition)  and  to  four  different  tests  (Categorical 
Recognition without labels; Categorical Recognition with labels; 
Word–Object Match; Property verification task). The procedure 
was identical to that of Experiment 2. We only introduced three 
variations: (1) all abstract words were presented using both the 
noun and the explanation, thus the No Explanation condition for 
abstract words was eliminated; (2) we added a further categorical 
recognition task after Training 2, in order to verify whether using 
category labels (for both concrete and abstract words) and expla-
nations (for abstract words) would facilitate recognition; (3) the 
entities to which the abstract words referred to were presented in 
different colors. Similarly to what we did with concrete ones, we 
assigned to each abstract category a specific color (light blue, light 
green, orange, and pink).
RESULTS
TEST 1: Categorical Recognition
In an ANOVA conducted on errors two factors were manipulated 
within participants, the factor Concept (Concrete vs. Abstract), and 
the factor Label Studied (Before vs. After learning the label desig-
nating the category). Only the factor Label Studied was significant, 
showing that more errors were produced before (M = 1.01%) than 
after learning the label (M = 0.29%), F(1,17) = 36.26, MSE = 0.26, 
p < 0.00005. Thus, both concrete and abstract category formation 
appears to benefit from language (see Table 3).
TEST 2: Words–Objects Match
An ANOVA was performed on errors produced in the word–
object match. Both the factors Word and Other Exemplar were 
significant. Abstract words (M = 4.46%) elicited more errors 
referred to by abstract rather than by concrete nouns. By adding 
an Explanation to the label (group B), the categorical boundaries 
with exemplars referred to by abstract nouns become marked as 
the ones referred to by concrete nouns.
More crucial to our hypotheses are the results of TEST 3. As pre-
dicted, we found that Abstract Words produced faster responses with the 
microphone than with the keyboard; by introducing the Explanation 
(group B) this difference becomes significant. Symmetrically, Concrete 
Words (group B) were responded to more quickly with the keyboard 
than with the microphone. This clearly supports the WAT proposal, 
as it suggests that concrete words evoke more manual information, 
whereas abstract words elicit more verbal information.
EXPERIMENT 3
A potential problem of Experiment 2 was that TEST 3 (the prop-
erty verification task) was submitted separately for concrete and 
abstract words. It is possible that, because abstract words always 
referred to blue objects, participants did not have to retrieve the 
perceptual properties of the single categories to respond, whereas 
this was necessary for concrete words. This could explain why RTs 
were faster with abstract than with concrete words. Experiment 3 is 
very similar to Experiment 2, with some modifications. First, given 
the interesting results obtained with explanations, we decided to 
use only the explanation condition with abstract words. Second, we 
balanced color information of objects referred to by both concrete 
and abstract categories, coloring the abstract figures. We used both 
concrete and abstract figures of different colors. We introduced this 
variation in order to solve the potential limitations of Experiment 
2, thus to avoid any facilitation with abstract words in responding 
to the property verification task due to the fact that all abstract 
words’ referents were blue in color. Third, in order to precisely 
control for the influence of learning the new labels of categoriza-
tion we decided to perform the category recognition task both 
before and after learning the category labels. Fourth, and most 
importantly, we decided to perform the property verification task 
at the end of the experiment, so that both concrete and abstract 
words were presented. This modification was introduced in order 
to be sure that participants referred to the learned category names 
to respond.
Table 3 | errors percentages and standard deviations (in parenthesis) for each TeST of experiment 3.
eXPeriMeNT 3
CATegOriCAl reCOgNiTiON: WiThOuT/WiTh lABel
Label Studied    Before learning the label  After learning the label
    1.01 (0.68)  0.29 (0.53)
WOrdS–OBjeCTS MATCh
Word    Concrete  Abstract
    2.20 (1.99)  4.46 (3.63)
Other Exemplar    Novel Exemplar  Learned Exemplar
    2.08 (2.49)  4.57 (3.22)
PrOPerTy veriFiCATiON TASK: KeyBOArd vS. MiCrOPhONe
  Device
    Keyboard  Microphone
Word  Abstract  4.17 (1.87)  2.87 (1.34)
  Concrete  2.35 (1.72)  3.56 (1.92)Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognition    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 15  |  10
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DISCUSSION
Results of Experiment 3 confirmed and extend those of Experiment 2, 
eliminating some potential problems. Differently from Experiments 
1 and 2, in TEST 1 (Categorical Recognition Task) we found no 
difference between abstract and concrete words, probably due to 
the fact that adding a property (color) to referents of abstract words 
increased their difference from contrast categories. Interestingly for 
us, in this experiment results of TEST 1 allowed us to conclude that 
the introduction of category labels facilitated categorization. The 
comparison between the same tasks performed before and after 
the linguistic training reveals this.
In TEST 2, the same pattern of results as Experiments 1 and 2 
emerged: abstract words elicited more errors than concrete ones, 
thus confirming their higher complexity as well as the fact that 
their borders are not so clearly marked as those observed between 
referents of concrete words.
In TEST 3, as expected, the advantage of abstract words over 
concrete ones disappeared. This confirms that it was due to the 
modifications we made: we introduced color differences between 
the entities to which abstract categories referred to, in order to 
be certain that the task did not differ in difficulty for concrete 
and  abstract  words.  The  interaction  between  Response  device 
and Words revealed that responses with the keyboard were always 
slower than responses with the microphone but that the discrepancy 
between microphone and keyboard was more marked with abstract 
than with concrete words. The pattern was complemented by the 
results on errors, which were fully in line with our predictions: more 
errors were elicited by abstract words using the keyboard, and by 
concrete words when using the microphone.
EXPERIMENT 4
The two last experiments left two issues unsolved. In Experiment 2 
we manipulated the presence of explanations, but only for abstract 
words. In Experiment 3 participants were given explanations to 
clarify abstract word meanings because this would mirror the typi-
cal acquisition process of abstract categories. However, manipu-
lating explanations only for abstract words did not allow us to 
precisely determine if there is an effect of explanation also for 
concrete words. Therefore, in Experiment 4 we presented only the 
category label or the label and the explanation for both concrete and 
abstract words. In addition, in this experiment for abstract words 
the information provided by perceptual input and that provided by 
the verbal label plus explanation were disentangled. To dissociate 
these two sources of information we used different colors for the 
members of abstract categories, in order to induce participants to 
categorize them on the basis of color, but the labels and explanations 
for these items still rested on items’ reciprocal interaction, rather 
than on their perceptual features. Therefore, with concrete items 
the label and the explanation converged with the category formed 
on the basis of perceptual Experience (Training 1), whereas with 
abstract items the verbal and perceptual experience did not match. 
This manipulation was introduced in order to verify whether the 
advantage of the microphone responses was simply due to phono-
articulatory aspects of the words or to their conceptual content as 
well. Our major predictions concerned TEST 3: (1) If the mouth 
activation found in Experiment 3 (TEST 3, vocal responses) is 
due to a motor phono-articulatory activation pertaining to the 
than concrete ones (M = 2.20%), F(1,17) = 8.42, MSE = 10.89, 
p < 0.01, and more errors were produced when the exemplar 
nearby had already been learned (M = 4.57%) than when it had 
not (M = 2.08%), F(1,17) = 61.85, MSE = 1.80, p < 0.000001 
(see Table 3).
TEST 3: property verification task with keyboard vs. microphone
In TEST 3 we collected both RTs and errors for the reasons 
we previously explained (see Experiment 2, TEST 3: Property 
Verification Task with Keyboard vs. Microphone). 12.93% of 
the trials was removed as errors. The same trimming method 
of Experiment 2 was used; this lead to the removal of 3.22% 
of the data. An ANOVA was performed with the two factors 
Words (Abstract vs. Concrete) and Response Device (Keyboard 
vs. Microphone) manipulated within participants. As expected, 
the  difference  between  Abstract  and  Concrete  Words  found 
in Experiment 2 disappeared (mean values were respectively 
M = 1150 and 1151 ms): this demonstrates that this difference 
was due to the fact that processing color was easier in Experiment 
2 for abstract words, as the entities they referred to were all of 
the same color. Crucial to our aims, the interaction between 
Word  and  Response  Device  was  significant,  F(1,17)  =  5.69, 
MSE = 6173.39, p < 0.03 (see Figure 4). LSD post hoc showed 
that responses with the keyboard were slower than responses with 
the microphone for both Abstract and Concrete Words; however, 
with the first the difference was more marked (p = 0.000005) 
than with the second (p = 0.005). In addition, responses with 
the Microphone in trend were faster with Abstract than with 
Concrete Words (p = 0.09).
The interaction was also significant in a further ANOVA we 
performed  on  errors  with  the  same  factors,  F(1,17)  =  35.62, 
MSE = 0.80, p < 0.00005. Post hoc LSD showed that, as predicted, 
Abstract Words (M = 4.17%) elicited more errors than Concrete 
Words (M = 2.35%) with the Keyboard (M = 2.87, 3.56% respec-
tively, p < 0.0005), while they elicited less errors than Concrete 
Words with the Microphone (p < 0.04). Responses to Abstract 
Words with the Keyboard produced more errors than all other con-
ditions except responses to Concrete Words with the Microphone. 
Responses to Concrete Words with the keyboard elicited fewer 
errors than all other conditions except responses to Abstract Words 
using the Microphone (see Table 3).
Figure 4 | experiment 3: interaction between Word (Abstract, Concrete) 
and response device (Keyboard, Microphone).www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 15  |  11
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Concrete Concepts (M = 3.60%), F(1,8) = 32.61, MSE = 15.38, 
p < 0.0005. The factor Label Studied did not reach significance, 
but we found a significant interaction between Concept and Label 
Studied, F(1,8) = 7.26, MSE = 1.83, p < 0.05 (see Table 4), due to 
the fact that after learning label + explanation errors decreased 
with concrete words (LSD post hoc, p > 0.005), but not with 
abstract ones.
TEST 2: Words–Objects Match
We performed two different ANOVAs on errors: one for the Label 
group and another for the Label + Explanation group. In the first 
ANOVA two factors were manipulated within participants: Word 
(Concrete vs. Abstract) and Other Exemplar (Exemplar already 
learned, with only linguistic label vs. Exemplar not learned). In the 
second ANOVA the same factors were manipulated, but the levels 
of the Other Exemplar factor differed (Exemplar already learned, 
with label + explanation vs. Exemplar not learned).
In both ANOVAs we found a significant main effect of the fac-
tor Word: fewer errors were produced with Concrete than With 
Abstract Words (group A: M = 2.55% and 6.48% respectively, 
F(1,8) = 8.31, MSE = 16.77, p < 0.05; group B: M = 2.66% and 7.29% 
respectively, F(1,8) = 22.13, MSE = 8.71, p < 0.005; see Table 4).
TEST 3: property verification task with keyboard and microphone
In TEST 3 for RTs 35.63% of the trials was removed as errors. We 
used the same trimming method as in previous experiments; this 
lead to the removal of 2.38% of the data. An ANOVA was performed 
with three factors: Word (Abstract vs. Concrete), Response Device 
(Keyboard vs. Microphone), and Verbal Explanation (Without vs. 
With), the last one manipulated between participants. We found 
that vocal responses (M = 1128.73 ms) were 147.57 ms faster than 
manual responses (M = 1276.30 ms), even if the factor Response 
superficial linguistic information, in Experiment 4 (TEST 3) we 
should find an advantage of vocal responses both with concrete 
and abstract words, as well as a main effect of the verbal explana-
tion. (2) If, consistent with the WAT proposal, the previously found 
advantage for vocal responses pertains also the category content, 
then it should play a major role if it complements information given 
by perception and action, not if it contrasts with it. Therefore we 
should find a difference with results of Experiment 3: there should 
be an advantage of the microphone over the keyboard only when 
the label and the explanation do not contrast with perceptually 
based categories. In this experiment, this contrast characterizes 
abstract categories.
METHOD
Participants
Eighteen students of the University of Bologna took part in the 
study (seven men; mean age = 24.55 years; SD = 3.66). All were 
native Italian speakers and right-handed.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 3, except for two 
variations. First, during Training 2 (Words Acquisition) half of the 
participants were taught the linguistic labels (Label group) vs. the 
linguistic labels plus the verbal explanation (Label + Explanation 
group), both for abstract and concrete items. The verbal explana-
tions for abstract items were the same used in Experiments 2 and 
3, so they basically described the kind of interaction. For concrete 
items the verbal explanations focused on the figure shape, avoiding 
any reference to its color (e.g., CALONA: “a figure having a concav-
ity”). The number of words for each explanation across both the 
abstract and the concrete blocks was equal.
Second, in Experiment 4 we used different colors for each cat-
egory member: for both concrete and abstract items, two members 
of each category had the same color as two members of another 
category. For example, FUSAPO surface could be yellow, blue, 
red, or sky-blue; its thickness was always the same, i.e., dark blue. 
NOROLO surface shared with FUSAPO surface yellow and blue 
colors, but it could be also green or violet; the color of the thickness 
was always dark blue.
RESULTS
TEST 1: Categorical Recognition
We performed two different ANOVAs on errors: one for the 
Label group and another for the Label + Explanation group. In 
the first ANOVA two factors were manipulated within partici-
pants, the factor Concept (Concrete vs. Abstract), and the factor 
Label Studied (Before vs. After learning the category label). In 
the second ANOVA we manipulated the same factors, but the 
levels of Label Studied factor differed (Before vs. After learn-
ing the category label with explanation). In the first ANOVA, 
both main effects were significant: more errors were produced 
with  Abstract  (M  =  7.41%)  than  with  Concrete  Concepts 
(M = 3.36%), F(1,8) = 7.73, MSE = 19.12, p < 0.03, and more 
errors were produced before (M = 6.54%) than after learning 
the label (M = 4.22%), F(1,8) = 17.31, MSE = 2.79, p < 0.005. 
The factor Concept was also significant in the second ANOVA: 
more errors were produced for Abstract (M = 11.17%) than for 
Table 4 | errors percentages and standard deviations (in parenthesis) for 
each TeST of experiment 4.
eXPeriMeNT 4
CATegOriCAl reCOgNiTiON: WiThOuT/WiTh lABel
Group A: label  Concept
    Concrete  Abstract
    3.36 (2.59)  7 .41 (5.04)
Group B: label + explanation  Concept
    Concrete  Abstract
    3.70 (2.35)  11.17 (4.47)
WOrdS–OBjeCTS MATCh
Group A: label  Word
    Concrete  Abstract
    2.55 (4.08)  6.48 (4.57)
Group B: label + explanation  Word
    Concrete  Abstract
    2.66 (4.45)  7 .20 (4.36)
PrOPerTy veriFiCATiON TASK
  Device
    Keyboard  Microphone
Word  Abstract  18.23 (8.37)  21.79 (6.17)
  Concrete  17 .36 (6.38)  13.89 (5.19)Frontiers in Psychology  | Cognition    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 15  |  12
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importance of manual interaction with objects. However, this does 
not account for the advantage of the microphone with concrete over 
abstract words.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
 Four experiments were designed to study the acquisition of concrete 
and abstract categories and words. We chose to use novel categories, 
in order to avoid confounds often associated with research on con-
crete and abstract words. We identified some characteristics which are 
typical of abstract but not of concrete categories, and we created novel 
categories according to these criteria. First, abstract categories do not 
refer to a single object but rather to a complex relationship between 
different objects. In addition, the entities to which abstract catego-
ries refer are not manipulable, even though they are perceivable, as 
they are interacting moving objects. Notice that our distinction does 
not cover the whole continuum ranging from abstract to concrete 
categories. Further work is needed for a thorough investigation of 
different typologies of abstract words (for attempts in this direction, 
see Rüschemeyer et al., 2007; Setti and Caramelli, 2005). Here we 
used two different examples of concrete and abstract words and have 
shown that different processes are involved in their acquisition.
In Experiment 1 we ascertained, using a production task, that 
the pattern of produced properties with our novel concrete and 
abstract categories was similar to that typically elicited by concrete 
and abstract words.
In  Experiments  2,  3,  and  4  we  introduced  a  modification: 
abstract words were not only learned by associating a label with 
the entities/relations they referred to, but also when an explana-
tion of their meaning was provided. This learning situation should 
resemble the learning process of children, as studies on MOA show. 
We found that this learning process influenced a later property 
verification task: participants responded earlier to concrete words 
while using the keyboard, while responses with abstract words were 
faster while using the microphone. Similar results with action words 
and effectors showed that, while comprehending sentences refer-
ring to mouth-related actions, response times were faster with the 
microphone than with the keyboard (Scorolli and Borghi, 2007). 
In addition, in line with WAT, participants’ performance with 
abstract words was improved when provided with a verbal expla-
nation (Experiment 2, group B; Experiment 3). This effect was 
not observed in concrete words. The fact that the advantage of the 
explanation was confined to abstract words revealed that the dif-
ference is not simply due to phono-articulatory aspects, but that 
for accessing the meaning of abstract words linguistic information 
plays a major role. This was confirmed in Experiment 4, in which 
we found that, due to the fact that with abstract words the verbal 
label and explanation were in contrast with the already formed 
perceptually based category, the advantage of the microphone over 
the keyboard was reduced compared to the other experiments.
Our results are in line with embodied and grounded theories of 
categorization and language comprehension. Namely, both the con-
crete and the abstract categories we used are embodied and grounded 
(e.g. Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Casasanto and Boroditsky, 
2008; Glenberg et al., 2008; Boot and Pecher, 2009), as they have objects 
or relations as referents. We were able to demonstrate that they are not 
only grounded in perception and action systems, but that for forming 
them language is important. This leads to the prediction that abstract 
Device did not reach significance, F(1,16) = 3.48, MSE = 112633, 
p < 0.08. The interaction between the factors Word and Response 
Device was significant, F(1,16) = 4.58, MSE = 47804.8, p < 0.05. 
The advantage of the microphone over the keyboard did not reach 
significance with abstract words (M = 1221.67 vs. M = 1184.37, 
respectively), while with concrete words responses with the micro-
phone (M = 1073.09) were faster than responses with the keyboard 
(M = 1330.93 ms; LSD, p > 0.01; see Figure 5).
Finally in the ANOVAs on errors with the same factors, we 
found that abstract words (M = 20.01%) elicited more errors than 
concrete ones (M = 15.63%), F(1,16) = 7.84, MSE = 44.13.08, 
p < 0.05. The significant interaction between Word and Response 
Device, F(1,16) = 5.87, MSE = 37.90, p < 0.05, was due to the 
fact that abstract words with the microphone (M = 21.79%) elic-
ited more errors than concrete words with both the keyboard 
(M = 17.36%) and the microphone (M = 13.89%; LSD post hoc, 
p > 0.05; see Table 4).
DISCUSSION
Results of TEST 1 indicate that the difference between the condi-
tion Label and No-Label increases when an explanation is added 
to the category name. Thus explanations facilitate categorization, 
as they render category boundaries more marked and clearer. 
However, the contribution of explanations is relevant only for 
concrete categories. For abstract categories, explanations do not 
help, as the information they provide is in contrast with perceptu-
ally based categorization.
Results of TEST 3 are the most intriguing. As predicted, partici-
pants were faster to respond with the microphone than with the 
keyboard with all words: this suggests that the phono-articulatory 
aspect of the words pronounced during acquisition affects per-
formance. It is unclear, however, why no effect of explanation was 
present. The most important result is the interaction showing that 
the advantage of the microphone over the keyboard is more marked 
with concrete than with abstract words, both in RTs and accuracy. 
This suggests that not only phono-articulatory but also conceptual 
information is at play in explaining the advantage of responses with 
the microphone. In fact this advantage shows up only when there is 
a convergence between the linguistic information (label and expla-
nation) and the category formed on sensorimotor basis, that is only 
with concrete words. One could object that the effect is due to the fact 
that explanations used with concrete words might have reduced the 
Figure 5 | experiment 4: interaction between Word (Abstract, Concrete) 
and response device (Keyboard, Microphone).www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 15  |  13
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in a very simple way, through adding labels or explanations to read 
and to associate with the relevant categories. Thus, language was 
not associated with a real social experience, as in real life. Further 
work should take into account aspects of social development which 
characterize language acquisition.
Finally, we believe this work has important implications for 
modeling. The design of the task is particularly suitable for further 
modeling applications and replications. We succeeded in isolating 
some properties we believe to be relevant in real-life categories 
and built novel categories based on our assumptions. We could 
verify that the behavioral responses produced within these novel 
categories  were  similar  to  the  ones  produced  within  real-life 
categories and settings. This procedure demands an additional 
modeling development. We believe that computational models 
can integrate and generate a more general description of the 
experimental results. For example, a robotic model, as discussed 
in the introduction, can benefit from a psychological theory that 
provides a possible way to tackle a new and complex problem for 
robotics itself, such the theory described focusing on the ground-
ing and acquisition of abstract words. On the other hand, the 
same robotic model can be tested in many different experimental 
situations, some of them not even applicable to human subjects. 
Experiments of this nature can complement and integrate experi-
ments with human participants and can offer new insights and 
hypotheses to test. Moreover, the process of developing artificial 
cognitive models always requires a profound articulation of the 
theory implemented. This fact forces the researcher to well define 
and to operationally describe every aspect of the theory and, at the 
same time, it emphasizes the importance of the central aspects of 
the theory, that can be fully exploited and validated by the model, 
at least as a preliminary proof of concept.
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words would not only activate linguistic areas in the brain, but also 
classic motor and sensorimotor areas (Scorolli et al., 2010; for initial 
fMRI results with existing concrete and abstract word combinations, 
see work performed within the project www.rossiproject.eu).
Results are in line with the predictions advanced by the WAT 
proposal. They reveal that a different learning process might lead to 
differences in performance on different tasks, such as a production 
task vs. a property verification task. In addition, the present study 
provides evidence that for representing abstract concepts motor 
linguistic information is more important than manual information, 
whereas for representing concrete concepts the pattern is opposite.
One effect was not predicted by the WAT proposal. Our results 
show that the formation of both concrete and abstract categories ben-
efits from learning a linguistic label. As it emerges from the categori-
cal recognition task in Experiment 3, language is relevant because it 
helps to better differentiate between categories (Mirolli and Parisi, 
in press). The recognition test in Experiment 4 (TEST 1a,b) shows 
that labeling is mostly helpful when an explanation of the category 
meaning is added. As shown in TEST 2 and TEST 3 of Experiment 
2, the benefit provided by language is higher in the case of abstract 
categories when a verbal explanation (group B) supports the linguis-
tic label. Nevertheless, when no explanation is provided, labeling is 
useful for both concrete and abstract categories. In sum: labeling 
helps categorization, independently of category complexity. However, 
even when no explanation is provided, given that abstract words do 
not refer to manipulable objects and are linked by complex relational 
properties, language plays a major role in their representation.
This opens an interesting scenario. Language is relevant for both 
concrete and abstract words because it helps better differentiate 
between categories. However, in tasks for which categorization is 
not relevant, such as the color verification task, it is more accessible 
in the representation of abstract than of concrete word meanings. 
This might occur because: (a) the members of abstract categories 
are not manipulable; and (b) more linguistic information is typi-
cally associated with the acquisition of abstract word meanings.
Further work should address unsolved issues in this research. 
One important expansion could be to introduce the social develop-
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